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NOTES
COVERT ENTRY, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: Dalia v. United States
Petitioner, convicted on two counts of conspiracy to steal an
interstate shipment of fabric, moved to suppress evidence obtained
by means of a "bugging" device installed in his office by FBI of-
ficials for a period of forty days. At an evidentiary hearing concern-
ing the method by which the "bug" had been installed, the federal
district court ruled that under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 19681 a covert entry to install otherwise
legal electronic eavesdropping equipment was not unlawful. The
Supreme Court, affirming the court of appeals decision, held that
the fourth amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry for
the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equip-
ment and that Title III impliedly authorizes such entry. Dalia v.
United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
Citizens are protected under the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution against "unreasonable searches and
seizures," and searches are permitted only under authority of war-
rants issued "upon probable cause."2 These protections developed in
the common law as a reaction to the evils of the general warrant,3
and, in the American colonies, to the writs of assistance which gave
customs officials blanket authority to conduct general searches for
goods imported in violation of the tax laws.' Reports from the Con-
stitutional Convention indicate that the purpose of the fourth
amendment was prevention of the use of such general warrants or
writs of assistance in the newly formed United States.'
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
3. Such warrants were declared illegal in England by the much celebrated case
of Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), in which Lord Camden declared
searches pursuant to general warrants issued in connection with seditious libel as
subversive of "all the comforts of society." Id. at 817.
4. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51 (1937). Official use of these writs is felt by many to
have been a direct cause leading to the American revolution and independence. Id. at
60-66.
5. Id. at 93-95. For an historical account of the fourth amendment, see Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures,
34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1921).
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The Supreme Court has found the fourth amendment's second
provision, or "warrant clause,"' to contain three requirements: (1)
that a search warrant be issued by a neutral, detached magistrate;
(2) that it issue only upon probable cause to believe the evidence will
aid in a particular apprehension or conviction of crime; and (3) that
warrants particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as the
place to be searched Additionally, the first clause of the fourth
amendment generally prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures."' Thus, a reasonableness standard must be applied to
every search, whether conducted with or without the authorization
of a warrant.'
While the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,"0 stated "the
Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitu-
tional 'right to privacy,""' the Court on other occasions found
privacy to be a fundamental right, along with other rights specifical-
ly enumerated in the Constitution. 2 In Boyd v. United States"3 the
Court described the fourth amendment as a protection against all
governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life."' Later, in Mapp v. Ohio,'" the fourth amendment
was interpreted as creating a "right to privacy, no less important
than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the peo-
ple."1 6
6. See note 2, supra.
7. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 309-10 (1967).
8. See note 2, supra.
9. In original draft the fourth amendment contained only one clause, providing
that the "right of the people to be secure .. . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause." N. LASSON,
supra note 4, at 101 (emphasis added). However, the fourth amendment was enacted as
two clauses. See id. at 101-03.
10. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. Id. at 350. However, the Court recognized the protection against governmen-
tal intrusion and declared "its protections go further, and often have nothing to do
with privacy at all." Id.
12. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
13. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
14. Id. at 630.
15. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. Id. at 656. Though only impliedly recognized by the fourth amendment, the
right to privacy is given express protection in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
which provides:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things
to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section
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As the protections embodied in the fourth amendment arise
from various individual liberties protected at common law, many
cases have recognized a special common law protection of privacy
within the home.17 One such recognition of the protection afforded
individuals was the "knock and announce" requirement that searches
be conducted only when an officer had announced his authority
and purpose prior to entering."i This common law protection was
made statutory in the federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 3109.1' In Ker v.
California" the Supreme Court dealt with the constitutionality of a
warrantless search following an unannounced entry pursuant to a
state statute very similar to the federal law."' The dissenting opin-
ion of Justice Brennan has been widely quoted as delineating three
major exceptions to the constitutional prohibition of unannounced
entries into a private home, with or without a warrant, which arise
shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
17. 116 U.S. at 626-30. "IThe Fourth Amendment did but embody a principle of
English history .... that finds another expression in the maxim 'every man's home is
his castle.' " Fraenkel, supra note 5, at 365, quoting T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 425 (7th ed. 1903).
18. For a comprehensive history of the "knock and announce" rule, see Son-
nenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, an Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 626 (1970); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139
(1970). The purposes of notice provided by the rule have been recognized as (1) the
prevention of violence to police and occupants, (2) protection from property damage
due to forced entry, and (3) protection from exposure of private activities. United
States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice
of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
Similarly, LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 224 provides:
In order to make an arrest, a peace officer, who has announced his authority and
purpose, may break open an outer or inner door or window of any ... dwelling ...
where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused or
otherwise obstructed from admittance. The peace officer need not announce his
authority and purpose when to do so would imperil the arrest.
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 164 provides that "[i]n order to execute a search warrant a
peace officer may use such means and force as are authorized for arrest." For an illus-
trative list of citations to state statutes requirng announcement of authority and pur-
pose before a forced entry to execute a warrant, see Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra note
18, at 654-59.
20. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). For a discussion of the Ker privacy basis, see Sonnenreich
& Ebner, supra note 18.
21. Though Ker was a four-one-four decision, both the opinion of Justice Clark and
that of Justice Brennan express the view that state searches must be judged by a con-
stitutional standard. Only Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, disapproved of this
view.
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when the need for evidence, the danger of its destruction, or the
danger of bodily harm overrides the interest in the inviolability of
the home.2
The law historically provided few protections unless the search
actually intruded into private territory. At common law the offense
of eavesdropping was punishable only as a misdemeanor.23 As early
as 1862 state statutes prohibiting the wiretapping of telegraph
wires were enacted," but there were no Supreme Court cases deal-
ing with electronic surveillance until 192825 and no federal statutes
in the area until 1934.26 Moreover, unless an illegal physical entry
was involved, the courts did not find the fourth amendment protec-
tion to be invoked. 7 But technological advances in electronic
eavesdropping or surveillance equipment were allowing "the
physical limits that once guarded individual and group privacy" 8 to
be overcome. Early in the 1960's the Court in Silverman v. United
States29 excluded evidence obtained by a "spike mike" because its
use through defendant's wall constituted a physical intrusion.
However, by this time the Court had entered a transitional period.
Though the trespass alone was a violation of the fourth amendment,
22. The exceptions delineated by Justice Brennan include: (1) useless gesture -the
person knows of the officers' authority and purpose; (2) apprehension of peril-the
officers are justified in a belief that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily
harm; and (3) possible destruction of evidence-persons are engaged in an activity
which justifies the officers' belief that an escape, or the destruction of evidence, would
be attempted if the persons are made aware of the presence of the officers. 374 U.S. at
46-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Certain other exceptions minimizing the requirement of notice have been recognized:
(1) entry for arrests and "no-knock" entry, allowed by statute in some states, see Son-
nenreich & Ebner, supra note 18, at 629-39; (2) entry into unoccupied dwellings, Payne
v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975); United
States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); and (3) subse-
quent notice on completion of surveillance operations, United States v. Donovan, 429
U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977). But see Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968) (entry
into a closed, but unlocked apartment, was held to violate 18 U.S.C. § 3109). In the
instant case, lack of notice was dismissed as a "frivolous" argument. 441 U.S. at 247.
23. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 168 (Lewis ed.
1902).
24. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967).
25. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
26. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976) (enacted in
response to Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). For a history of wiretap
and bugging cases, see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-53 (1967).
27. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (use of detectaphone on adjoin-
ing party wall not unlawful); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (wiretap
not violative of fourth amendment because no physical entry involved).
28. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (1966).
29. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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the Court acknowledged that the decision also rested on the "actual
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." 0 Two years later,
relying on Silverman, the Court, in Wong Sun v. United States,"1
granted an additional individual protection equally important in its
use against eavesdropping. In that case, the Court specifically held
for the first time that verbal statements, as well as physical
evidence, are protected by the fourth amendment.
By the mid-sixties, concern and interest in federal electronic
surveillance legislation developed. The Supreme Court set forth
stringent fourth amendment requirements for electronic surveillance
in Berger v. New York," which involved a challenge to "the validity
of New York's permissive eavesdropping statute." 4 Justice Clark
declared for the majority that the statute authorized surveillance in-
volving "trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected area
and [was], therefore, violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."3 In overruling the decisions of the lower courts, the
Supreme Court held the statute to be overly broad in its sweep by
entrusting too much discretion to the executing officer in a manner
reminiscent of the general warrants;36 the Court stressed the need
for warrants particularly describing the place to be searched and in-
formation to be seized 7 and showing "exigent circumstances" to
overcome the lack of notice for such an "uncontested entry."8 The
Court emphasized the highly egregious nature of electronic
surveillance, when the "innermost secrets of one's home or office are
invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that
posed by the use of eavesdropping devices."39
30. Id at 512.
31. 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
32. R. VEGA, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF GOVERN-
MENT EAVESDROPPING 166-75 (1974).
33. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Berger Court held the New York electronic
surveillance statute invalid as overbroad and equal to a trespassory intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area. Although Berger involved a physical entry into private
premises, in Dalia both proponents and opponents of additional fourth amendment
requirements for covert entry agreed that Berger guidelines were aimed at invasion of
the privacy of the conversation.
34. Id. at 43. Berger was convicted on two counts of conspiracy to bribe the state
liquor authority. Petitioner contended that verbal evidence obtained via a recording
device installed pursuant to section 813-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure
(ex parte order for eavesdropping) violated the fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments.
35. 388 U.S. at 44.
36. Id. at 59.
37. Id. at 55-56.
38. Id. at 60.
39. Id. at 62-63.
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With Katz" the Supreme Court dramatically departed from past
jurisprudence and its approach towards protection of verbal com-
munications by recognizing that the "Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places."" No longer did the Court look merely to where
the statements were made; in fact, it may have considered only the
expectation of the speaker. The Court recognized that the problem
is not solved by the phrase "constitutionally protected area."'2
Rather, protection is required for all communication which one
"seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public." 3 However, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."" While the decision in Katz greatly
increased individual protection under the fourth amendment, the
opinion has been viewed as representing a switch in emphasis from
places to persons." Serving to bury the trespass theory of earlier
decisions" and to abandon the protected area concept, the opinion
signalled the adoption of a new tack by the Court. Indicative of this
new approach is the Court's statement that "the reach of [the
Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure."'7
Using procedural and substantive guidelines provided by the
Berger and Katz decisions, Congress in 1968 enacted Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. This wiretap title was
added in response to public sentiment against a rising crime rate.4
Congress attempted to protect the privacy of communications while,
on balance, promoting more effective control of crime." Thus, Title
III was drafted to have as "its dual purpose (1) protecting the
privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a
uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the
interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized."5
The desire was to circumscribe carefully the situations in which a
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id at 351.
42. Id. at 350.
43. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
44. Id. (Emphasis added.)
45. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 114 (1969).
46. See text at notes 28-31, supra.
47. 389 U.S. at 353.
48. S. REP. No. 1097, 90TH CONG., 2D JESS., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2113 & 2115 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The legislation was
controversial when enacted and remains so. See id. at 2222 (views of Mr. Long of
Missouri and Mr. Hart); id at 2227 (view of Mr. Hart); id at 2238 (view of Mr.
Burdick); id. at 2238 & 2241 (view of Mr. Fong); id. at 2245-46 (view of Mr. Bayh).
49. Id. at 2153-63.
50. Id. at 2153.
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surveillance order could be issued51 so as effectively to minimize, if
not eliminate, the danger of "unreasonable searches." To this end,
the statute lists explicit procedures to be followed and information
to be provided in the application for such an order,"2 as well as in
the reports regarding such intercepted communications." Yet
nowhere in this otherwise explicit procedure does the legislation
authorize covert entry to install a wiretap or a bug."4 Moreover, a
minority opinion in the Senate committee report reflects the con-
cern of several congressional members that authorization to wiretap
might ostensibly open the legislative door to the Orwellian society
of 1984."5
In the instant case, after a probable cause hearing, Justice
Department officials received court authorization under 18 U.S.C. §
2518 to intercept telephone conversations on two telephones in the
business office of Lawrence Dalia.8 At the end of an initial twenty-
day surveillance period an extension of the order was granted,
coupled with permission to intercept all oral conversation taking
place in the petitioner's office. Although no explicit authority was
granted by the court to effect a physical entry of defendant's
office, 57 FBI agents secretly broke and entered Dalia's office at mid-
night, spending three hours installing in the ceiling an electronic
"bug" which remained for forty days.58 Two years later Dalia was
indicted on five counts of conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment
of fabric. 9 A pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence obtained with
the bug was denied, and Dalia was subsequently convicted on two
counts. After conviction the motion was renewed, and an eviden-
tiary hearing was held concerning the method (i.e., the forcible en-
try) by which the electronic device had been installed.", The
51. I at 2177-97. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 & 2518 (1976).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1976).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (1976).
54. Though Title III is silent on the issue of entry, at least one authority has sug-
gested that "the prudent approach would be to include a statement in the application
explaining why secret entry is necessary." C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROP-
PING §§ 104 & 117 (1978).
55. SENATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 2223 & 2238.
56. 441 U.S. at 241.
57. I& at 242-44.
58. On March 14, 1973, a wiretap order was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 for
Dalia's business phones. At the end of the twenty-day period covered by the warrant,
the government applied for a twenty-day extension and, in addition, permission to
intercept all oral conversations in the office. The order issued April 5, when FBI
agents broke and entered at midnight, spending three hours installing a bug in the
ceiling. The order was extended on April 27, and the agents re-entered petitioner's
office on May 16 to remove the bug. 441 U.S. at 241-42 & 245.
59. 441 U.S. at 243.
60. 426 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1977).
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Supreme Court, in affirming the appellate court decision,"' held that
a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise
legal electronic bugging equipment is not prohibited per se by the
fourth amendment.62 The Court further held that the fourth amend-
ment does not require specific authorization for covert entry to be
described in a surveillance order 3 as the authorization is provided by
the statute itself."' Three members of the Court dissented from the
entire majority opinion, 5 while a fourth member joined in dissenting
from the latter holding.6
The main question in Dalia concerned the reasonableness of the
method of execution by the officers." So long as a warrant comply-
ing with the three warrant requirements is issued,6 the Court found
nothing in the Constitution or prior decisions to suggest that "war-
rants also must include a specification of the precise manner in
which they are to be executed," 9 the method being left to the exec-
uting officer. In Dalia, the Court, in a seemingly pragmatic decision,
found covert entry to be the "safest and most successful method" of
execution under the circumstances. 0
The Supreme Court in Dalia resolved a conflict among appellate
court rulings regarding the permissibility of covert entry for the
purpose of executing electronic surveillance orders. 7' The result
reached depends in part upon a finding that Title III impliedly
authorizes such entry, though this legislation contains no specific
statement as to the method of execution. Justice Powell concluded
for the majority that Congress had not addressed this issue only
because it saw no problem with the method of execution."2 Rather, in
authorizing electronic surveillance, Congress impliedly authorized
covert entry as essential for the installation of devices used to con-
duct such surveillance.7 1
61. 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978).
62. 441 U.S. at 248.
63. Id. at 258-59.
64. Id. at 254.
65. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall. 441 U.S. at 262.
66. Justice Stewart. 441 U.S. at 259.
67. 441 U.S. at 246.
68. Id. at 255. See text at note 7, supra.
69. 441 U.S. at 257.
70. Id. at 248 n.8, citing 426 F. Supp. at 866. But see 441 U.S. at 270 n.20 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
71. 441 U.S. at 241 n.3. See also Note, Covert Entry in Electronic Surveillance:
The Fourth Amendment Requirements, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 203 (1978).
72. 441 U.S. at 251-52.
73. The majority in Dalia relied heavily on legislative history for the proposition
that such authorization was implied in the statute and that the statute was constitu-
tional. Id. at 249-54. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 48.
[Vol. 40
NOTES
However, Congress may not have intended to sanction this
method of execution. Title III's particularity in other areas seems to
refute the implication that by remaining silent on the issue of covert
entry, Congress intended to authorize it.7" Instead, Congress may
have intended that Title III receive a narrow construction.
Moreover, the Senate committee's report stated that "electronic
surveillance techniques [would] be used only under the most precise
and discriminate circumstances."75 Justice Stevens argued in his dis-
sent that the majority has turned the "silence into thunder,"7 inter-
preting congressional silence an "open-ended authorization to effect
such illegal entries without an explicit judicial determination.""
In finding "no basis for a constitutional rule proscribing all
covert entries,"" the Court cited cases which may not necessarily
support its view. Reliance on two early electronic surveillance cases
for the implication that covert entry to install electronic bugging
devices would be constitutional if done pursuant to a search war-
rant79 appears to be an oversimplification of the issues involved in
covert entry, for in neither would the search clearly have been valid
if done merely pursuant to a warrant. In Irvine v. California,"0
officers entered surreptitiously, without a warrant, to install con-
cealed microphones. The Court found that "[flew police measures
[had] come to [their] attention that more flagrantly, deliberately,
and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by
the Fourth Amendment."'" The conviction, however, was upheld,
but only because the exclusionary rule had not been applied to
the states. The implication that merely securing a warrant would
have cured the fourth amendment ills of the covert entry does not
appear as clear as the Dalia opinion implies. 2 Silverman v. United
States,3 cited by the Dalia Court, concerned an "entry" dramatically
different from that of the instant case. There officers merely
inserted a listening device through defendant's wall and did not
themselves enter the premises, an action which would have exposed
more than mere conversation.
74. 441 U.S. at 266-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. SENATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 2191.
76. 441 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 266.
78. 441 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added).
79. Id., citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128 (1954). But see 441 U.S. at 277-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
81. Id. at 132.
82. 441 U.S. at 277-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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Additionally, the Court, citing Ker,"4 stated that under certain
prescribed conditions "[i]t is well established that law officers con-
stitutionally may break and enter to execute a search warrant."8
However, that decision delineated exceptions only to the "knock and
announce" rule. Such exceptions contemplate a dwelling that is
occupied; a covert entry requires vacancy. The Court also cited
Payne v. United States,88 in which the fifth circuit held in 1975 that
a search pursuant to a warrant conducted in the absence of the occu-
pants was valid. However, this does not sanction police invasion of
an unoccupied dwelling to search for evidence which might arise,
nor sanction an entry or multiple entries of which the occupants are
uninformed. Surreptitious entry, as contemplated by electronic
surveillance, allows both.
If the opinion in Dalia is to be interpreted as establishing a
"judicial exception" to the strict statutory requirements for elec-
tronic surveillance through implied authorization in the statute,
perhaps it is a very limited case. The Court and Congress have
recognized that the requirements surrounding electronic
surveillance are highly circumscribed. However, by its use of broad
language, the Court may have created a larger entry exception than
intended. For example, the Court states that the manner in which a
search warrant is to be executed is "generally left to the discretion
of the executing officers,"87 rather than to the discretion of a
neutral, detached magistrate.8
Outside the authorization ascribed to Title III by the Court, no
federal statute presently authorizes covert entry for the execution
of a search warrant. 9 After Dalia, the question arises whether
courts will read into other statutes such implied authorization, in
cases in which officers determine that such entry is "the safest and
most successful method" of conducting a search." If Dalia is to be
read for this proposition, we may soon see statutes and warrants
authorizing breaking and entering for even non-electronic continuing
84. See notes 20-22, supra, and accompanying text.
85. 441 U.S. at 247.
86. 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. 441 U.S. at 257.
88. 441 U.S. at 261 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part), quoting
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
89. The most expansive federal statute expressly authorizing entry without notice
was section 509 of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1970)
(repealed 1974), envisioning the presence of the occupants. In repealing this statute in
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481 §§ 3-4, 83 Stat. 1455 (1974), Congress indicated acceptance of
judicial exceptions to the rule of knock and announce. CONF. COMM. REP. No. 1442,
93RD CONG., 2D SESS., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5974, 5977.
90. 441 U.S. at 248 n.8. But see 441 U.S. at 270 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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surveillance apart from Title III. Once such statutes and warrants
permit entry into a house or office, any evidence in "plain view"'"
would be subject to seizure, and any personal papers and belongings
subject to examination. Such a procedure could give officers great
freedom to enter offices or homes and to conduct informal physical
searches without full warrant authorization."
To place the Dalia holding in context, it must be remembered
that a magistrate had already authorized the "search" of words
spoken in the defendant's office. However, in breaking and entering
the defendant's office, police used a method of conducting that
"search" which could have resulted in the search and seizure of
things not within the warrant. Prior to Dalia, protections against
such a method seemed to arise from two sources: (1) the Katz
privacy expectation and (2) the traditional protections afforded
private premises. As to the Katz protection, the issuance of the war-
rant removed Dalia's "reasonable" expectation of privacy in his
spoken words, the Court apparently ruling that along with that
expectation went the expectation of the physical inviolability of his
office." The Court's rationale further indicates that the traditional
protections afforded places did not apply.
With the decision in Dalia, the continuing efficacy of the tradi-
tional protections is now open to question. At the least, Dalia indi-
cates that Katz should be narrowly interpreted in those situations in
which the Court is impressed with the need for evidence and the
officers' inability to obtain it other than by covert entry, thus
requiring a balancing test reminiscent of Ker. It is submitted that in
the instant case the Court, in balancing the state's interest with the
individual's right to privacy, misperceived and underestimated the
egregious nature of the unauthorized secret entry and paid insuffi-
91. The "plain view" doctrine requires the police to (1) be legitimately on the
premises, (2) view the evidence inadvertently, and (3) immediately recognize it as
evidence. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). The defendant in Dalia
argued that electronic surveillance warrants were unique because the right to hold
private conversations is affected in addition to possible damage to property and
unauthorized examination of personal effects. The Court felt this view "parses too finely
the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment." 441 U.S. at 257.
92. The framers of the Constitution intended by the fourth amendment "to
eliminate once and for all the odious practice of searches under general warrant and
writs of assistance against which English law had generally left them helpless." Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. at 51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. See 441 U.S. at 263 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 325 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (use of covert
entry should be restricted by the Court because the protections afforded against other
governmental intrusions, such as damage actions, political reforms, adverse publicity,
are not viable protections when the victims would be unaware of a lawless search).
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cient attention to the great constitutional protection of privacy
traditionally afforded. Hopefully, methods sanctioned in Dalia will
be strictly limited to those situations in which resort to the twen-
tieth century technology of electronic surveillance is the only way to
provide any measure of adequate law enforcement.9" The
reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment 5 should be the over-
riding concern, and, in light of the protections historically embodied
in the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Supreme Court should strictly and explicitly limit con-




THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND STANDING REVISITED
Defendants were convicted of armed robbery in an Illinois state
court. At trial the prosecution was allowed to offer into evidence a
sawed-off rifle and shells that had been seized without a warrant
from under the seat and from the glove compartment of an
automobile in which the defendants had been passengers. Neither
defendant asserted ownership of the rifle and shells. The Illinois
appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of a motion to sup-
press the evidence, holding that the defendants lacked standing to
object to the alleged unlawful search and seizure.' Affirming the
convictions, the United States Supreme Court for the first time sub-
Sumed standing into the fourth amendment inquiry, determined that
the defendants "made no showing that they had . . . [the necessary)
legitimate expectation of. privacy"' in the areas searched and items
seized, and thus held that the search "did not violate any rights of
these petitioners."' Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
The fourth amendment expressly guarantees "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." In delineating the pro-
94. 441 U.S. at 270 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. See note 2, supra.
1. People v. Rakas, 46 Ill. App. 3d 569, 360 N.E.2d 1252 (1977).
2. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433 (1978).
3. Id. at 434.
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